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Abstract: Scholars have long hypothesized that democratic forms of government are more 
compatible with scientific advancement. However, empirical analysis testing the democracy-
science compatibility hypothesis remains underdeveloped. This article explores the effect of 
democratic governance on scientific performance using panel data on 124 countries between 
2007 and 2018. We find evidence supporting the democracy-science hypothesis, with 
strongest effects of egalitarian democracy on national scientific performance. Further, using 
both internal and external measures of complexity, we estimate the effects of complexity as a 
moderating factor between the democracy-science connection. The results show differential 
main effects of economic complexity, globalization, and international collaboration on 
scientific performance, as well as significant interaction effects that moderate the effect of 
democracy on scientific performance. The findings show the significance of democratic 
governance and complex systems in national scientific performance.  
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• Scholars suggest the hypothesis that democratic governance enhances the scientific performance of nations 
vis a vis value congruency and structural complexity.  
• The rise of scientific systems in countries with authoritarian governance and the scientific decline of 
democratizing countries challenges the hypothesis.  
• This study tests the hypothesis using data on democracy, complexity, and science on a panel of 124 
countries over an eleven-year period.  
• The results provide support for the hypothesis but suggest more nuanced moderating effects of complexity 
on the democracy-science relationship.  
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1. Introduction 
Studies of science policy have long suggested that political, economic, and scientific systems 
are interdependent, but the nature of the relationship and the direction of causality remain 
unclear. Strasser (2009) suggested that society and culture are determinants of the 
construction of science. Sociologists and philosophers of science, such as Merton (1973), 
Popper (1966), and Kitcher (2003), asserted that democracy is conducive to the advancement 
of scientific research. Recent research on international scientific openness and mobility also 
suggest a positive effect on national systems of science (Wagner et al 2018a, 2018b). Weisner 
et al. (2018) suggest democracies may permit greater structural complexity and stability, 
creating conditions wherein scientific inquiry can thrive. If it true that science operates as a 
modular loosely coupled system with an emergent networked architecture (e.g. Simon 1966), 
then the mutual complexity of democracy and science may produce benefits for both. 
However, empirical studies have yet to adequately address questions about the relationship 
between forms of government and the performance of national systems of science.  
At the macro-level, the relationship between democracy and science has mostly been 
analysed conceptually and with the use of exemplar cases. Parsons (1951), Ben-Joseph (1971) 
and Giddens (1987) suggested that science is integrated with the social structures and cultural 
traditions of society. Barber (1953) and Ferris (2010) reiterated the Enlightenment view that 
liberal societies and science share common values. Thus, democracies often promote 
economic growth through scientific progress. Merton (1978) and Harrison & Johnson (2009) 
argued that both science and democratic societies share the unique feature of universalism, 
while autocratic societies undermine this principle through the exaltation of political ideology. 
Popper (1966) argued that the open society permits greater contact with new ideas from 
abroad and those that arise internally.  
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While research on national innovation systems emerged to explain how governments, 
universities, and firms produce innovative outcomes during the last quarter of the 20th century 
(Freeman, 1987; Nelson & Rosenberg 1993; Lundvall et al., 2002; Godin, 2009; Taylor 
2016), others have increasingly pointed to the interconnectedness of national level institutions 
forming a complex global system of science and technology (Tyson, 1988; Archibugi et al., 
1999; Carlson, 2006; Wagner 2009). Recent research suggests international scientific 
openness and mobility have positive effects on country level scientific performance (Wagner 
et al. 2018a, 2018b). However, the relationship between varieties of democracy and science 
and technology remains unclear (Gao et al. 2017).  
We find arguments about the necessary relationship between democracy and science 
compelling, yet the coexistence of successful scientific systems coupled with authoritarian 
governance, e.g. the Soviet Union or contemporary China, challenges the hypothesis. This 
article builds on theory in science and technology policy, leveraging national measures of 
scientific performance to measures of democratic governance. Theory suggests that 
democratic governance may enhance system complexity (Weisner et al. 2018), which we 
operationalise using measures of economic complexity, globalization, and international 
collaboration intensity to test the democracy-science compatibility thesis. While previous 
research has focused on national openness and mobility (e.g. Sugimoto et al, 2017; Wagner et 
al 2018a, 2018b), the current article conceptualizes these concepts within the broader category 
of external complexity, treating economic complexity as a measure of internal complexity. 
By emphasizing the complex interdependence of national systems and the larger global 
system, this article builds a unified theoretical approach to the study of scientific performance.  
This article tests two empirical research questions using fixed effects regression on a 
large panel of 124 countries over an eleven year period: 1) what is the effect of democratic 
governance on the scientific performance of nations in the international system; and 2) how 
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do internal and external complexity moderate the democracy-science effect. To address these 
questions, this article combines longitudinal data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
Project with bibliometric data on scientific performance from Elsevier/Scopus, as well as data 
from the MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, and 
the World Bank.  
 
2. Literature  
2.1. Governance & Science. Parsons (1951) suggested that the development of science 
is integrated with the social structures and cultural traditions of a given society. In this sense, 
there is a suggested compatibility between the social structures of science and society. 
Structural determinants of science vis-à-vis society are particularly salient regarding the 
institutionalization of science in organizations and the conceptualization of the “scientist” in 
terms of a formal occupational role.  
This article emphasizes the broader mechanisms outside of science, e.g. national 
system of governance, economic structure, cultural values, etc. This article focuses on science 
in society, and not the society of science. Variance in socio-cultural structure within which 
science operates has direct implications for the structure and performance of science. Building 
on Parsons, Barber (1953) suggests that the cultural values of liberal society are congruent 
with those of science. The cultural values that Barber identifies as congruent with science are 
rationality, utilitarianism, universalism, individualism, and progress. Thus, the congruency 
between democracy and science on structure and values produce more favourable conditions 
for the development and flourishing of science.  
Merton (1973) emphasizes universalism in the value congruency between democratic 
forms of government and the enterprise of science, where universalism entails that “truth 
claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to pre-established impersonal criteria: 
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consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge” (Merton, 1973, p. 
270, emphasis in original). For Merton, the universalism of science is compatible with 
democracy but clashes with totalitarianism based on political, religious, or ethnic identity. 
Under totalitarian regimes, science becomes the “handmaiden” of an ethic that subordinates 
scientific theory to political identity (Merton 1938). In contrast to more decentralized 
democratic governments, Merton (1973) suggests totalitarian governments impose centralized 
control that infringes upon free inquiry: “In modern totalitarian society, anti-rationalism and 
the centralization of institutional control both serve to limit the scope provided for scientific 
activity” (Merton 1973, p. 278). In this sense, democracy decentralizes power to individual 
citizens, rather than centralizing it in the state. Decentralized structure permits free association 
and expression based on universalistic truth claims that are not subordinated by the privileged 
particularisms of whatever dominant political ideology is ascendant.  
Like the Mertonian argument for the compatibility of democracy and science, Popper 
(1966) suggested that closed autocratic societies tend to be philosophically situated on fixed 
but fragile historicist visions. Unconstrained scientific progress threatens to undermine these 
fragile visions and so poses a significant threat to the centralized power of autocratic regimes. 
As Popper suggested, antiquated scientific conceptions often emphasized “methodological 
essentialism” that attempts to identify unchanging Platonic forms underlying empirical 
phenomena. While compatible with an autocratic Republic envisioned by Plato, contemporary 
science challenges these fixed historicist visions. Thus, scientists must be free to pursue 
‘truth,’ (or validity) and open societies provide a better context for the questioning and 
experimentation of scientific activity. Autocratic regimes constrain the activities of scientists 
to those that do not challenge centralized social control, while democratic regimes permit 
greater autonomy in the pursuit of scientific truth. According to Mokyr (2017) the variation, 
6 
 
openness, and competition between ideas that characterised Western European societies can 
explain why the scientific and technological revolution occurred there rather than in China.  
 The democracy-science compatibility thesis, however, is not a given among scholars 
of science and technology studies. Stephan (2012) softens this view by pointing out that 
democratic government seeks new knowledge for socially beneficial outcomes, but without 
specifying outcomes beforehand. Democracy may also pose unique threats to scientific 
advancement when public opinion shifts against topics of inquiry, such as the theory of 
evolution (Kitcher 2003).1  
Gao et al. (2017) recently attempted to test a hypothesis, orthogonal to our own, of 
whether democracy is conducive to technological innovation. They were unable to show such 
a relationship between democracy measures and patent data in their analysis. They do 
however confirm an emerging body of literature that suggests openness can be a strong factor 
in technological progress, as noted above. Indeed, national openness appears to be strongly 
associated with scientific impact, where openness is operationalized through international co-
authorship data and mobility statistics on the scientific workforce (Wagner et al. 2018a, 
2018b; Chinchilla-Rodríguez 2018; Robinson-Garcia et al. 2019). However, we remain 
sceptical that Gao et al’s (2017) finding generalizes to a non-significant relation between 
democratic governance and science. Following on the above conceptual work and research 
empirical work, we advance a positive hypothesis regarding the theoretical relationships 
between democracy and science. 
Hypothesis 1: Democratic governance enhances the scientific performance of 
countries in the international system. 
 
1 Nahuis and Van Lente (2008) suggest the direction of causality might be reversed, where science may undermine 
or displace democracy. Studies of science and technology have examined public participation in science 
(Lengwiler 2008), responsibilities of science given a democratic context (Stilgoe, Owen, & Macnagthen, 2013), 
and the potential dangers of science in undermining democracy (Durant, 2011). This is a sensible concern given 
the potential dangers that science poses to human subjects (Proctor 1988), as well as the power dynamics associated 
with the elevation of expert over the popular will (Brown 2009).   
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Much of the conceptual and comparative casework outlined above suggests that 
specific values or structures may be implicated to a greater degree than other less salient 
points of contact. The question is, what specific values or structures of society are compatible 
with science? Among the values that recur in this literature are openness, objectivity, 
autonomy, and universality. Further, decentralization of power in socio-political structures is 
also compatible with the decentralization of scientific activity in myriad disciplines and fields, 
as well as the system of peer-review that decentralizes academic authority to the scientists. 
Each of these elements have analogues in various conceptualizations of democracy.  
Numerous indicators have been proposed to measure forms of democracy, e.g. Polity 
IV and the Economist Democracy Index. Recently, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
project has provided detailed longitudinal data on several high-level indexes of democracy 
aggregated from hundreds of empirical measures. The overarching concept of electoral 
democracy in the V-Dem data is based on Dahl’s (1998) notion of polyarchy, or “rule by 
many”. The V-Dem project defines democracy in terms of the following five elements: “(1) 
elected officials; (2) free, fair and frequent elections; (3) freedom of expression and 
alternative sources of information; (4) associational autonomy; and (5) inclusive citizenship 
(universal suffrage)” (Coppedge et al. 2016: 582). Under this conceptual scheme, the electoral 
democracy index is the basic concept of polyarchy, which is additive in the sense that the 
other four indexes also include this index. This study operationalizes the first hypothesis using 
the electoral democracy index of the V-Dem project. 
2.2. Internal Complexity & Science. The argument for the democracy-science 
connection may be extended through an analysis of structural complexity, where the 
organizational/institutional structure of science is critical to progress. The contemporary 
structure of science is decentralized in a modular global network with self-similar structure up 
and down levels of analysis (Wagner & Leydesdorff, 2005; Wagner, Whetsell, & 
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Leydesdorff, 2017). As Simon (1996) observed, modular, loosely coupled hierarchies can be 
more efficient at handling uncertainty than fully centralized hierarchies. Kontopoulos (2006) 
refers to this type of structure as a heterarchy. A core activity of science is to create 
knowledge at the margins of epistemic uncertainty. Therefore, decentralized modular 
institutional systems are perhaps better suited to the flourishing of science than centralized 
hierarchies. Wiesner et al. (2018) suggest that democracies may permit greater structural 
complexity and stability. Since science operates as a complex, loosely coupled system with an 
emergent networked architecture (Wagner, 2008; Simon 1996), such systems may permit 
greater internal complexity in its cultural, social, and economic systems.  
Research on economic complexity suggests that national capacity for the integration of 
diverse sources of knowledge is a unique resource explaining differences in gross domestic 
product (GDP) between nations (Hidalgo and Hausman 2009). National capacity for 
economic complexity may also contribute to relative differences in national systems of 
science. The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) is defined as the knowledge intensity of a 
country’s export products. ECI+ modifies the variable by accounting for the difficulty of 
exporting products for the country. While the ECI is based on an analysis of the knowledge 
intensity of the export products in a nation’s economy, this measure may serve as a useful 
proxy for the availability and complexity of knowledge in a country in general. As Nelson and 
Rosenberg (1993) suggested, science both leads and follows technology, i.e. the two are 
closely intertwined. Hence, the complexity of a country’s technological products may be 
partially indicative of the complexity of the institutional structure of scientific production.  
This article conceptualizes economic complexity as a form of internal complexity, 
which signals the level of internal differentiation and diversity of a country’s epistemic 
institutions. The decentralization of political power in democracies may be more compatible 
with the internal structural complexity necessary for scientific performance. As such, 
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economic complexity may enhance the democracy-science relationship by enriching systems 
of science with dense flows of information and greater serendipity in the generation of novel 
combinations of existing knowledge (e.g. Wagner, Whetsell, and Mukherjee 2019). This 
study advances the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Economic complexity moderates the democracy-science relationship 
among countries in the international system. 
2.3. External Complexity & Science. The degree to which a society creates new 
knowledge does not only depend on the extent to which indigenous flowers can bloom. New 
ideas, technologies and values may also originate from beyond the national context. Contacts 
with other cultures through trade and cultural exchange have been at the basis for many 
scientific and technological advances over the course of the past centuries, and the degree of 
receptiveness to foreign ideas may explain a large share of the difference in long term 
scientific and technological performance between countries over time (Mokyr, 2017). Taylor 
(2016) argued that the extent to which societies are integrated in the global system measured 
in terms of trade, investments, culture and political ties following the KOF Globalisation 
index (Dreher, 2006; Savina et al., 2018) can explain a relatively large degree of the variation 
in technological performance of countries. This article conceptualizes globalization as a form 
of external complexity. Just as decentralization in political authority may be compatible with 
decentralization, differentiation, and diversification of scientific institutions, so too it may be 
compatible with the proliferation of institutional linkages that span national boundaries. 
There are many ways to conceptualize the relative globalization of a country. 
Traditional realist international relations theory may conceptualize globalization as an 
extension of state power (Mearsheimer 2001), while liberal internationalist theory might view 
it as a set of international regimes designed to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation 
(Keohane 1984). In keeping with the theme of complexity, the globalization of a country may 
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be conceptualized as a type of external complexity, where the internal knowledge intensity of 
an economy is integrated with a macro-system that is in some sense separate or above the 
national systems. In this sense, we may conceptualize globalization as an emergent property 
of the interaction between countries.  
While the hypothesis has never been tested, an extension of existing theory suggests 
globalization might play a moderating role in the democracy-science relationship. 
Democracies might fare better in their pursuit of science, not only because of their internal 
culture and complexity, but also through increased contact with international sources of 
knowledge and their integration with the global network of scientific activity. As such, we 
advance the following hypothesis which regards globalization as a dynamic that integrates 
national systems with the broader international system. 
Hypothesis 3: Globalization moderates the democracy-science relationship among 
countries in the international system. 
 Another type of external complexity that has received a great deal of attention in 
recent decades is the ever-increasing rate of international collaboration in scientific research. 
Numerous studies have documented the rise of internationally co-published research (e.g. 
Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005; Wagner, Whetsell, Leydesforff, 2017). Studies have also 
documented the increasing impact on international collaboration on scientific outcomes such 
as the influence and novelty of research (Sugimoto et al, 2017; Chinchilla-Rodríguez 2018; 
Robinson-Garcia et al. 2019; Wagner, et al. 2018a, 2018b; Wagner, Whetsell, and Mukherjee 
2019). We extent theory on international collaboration by considering it as a type of 
globalization that is specific to the sciences. While the KOF globalization index is a 
composite of numerous social, economic and political indicators, international research 
collaboration is more specifically bounded as the co-publication of scientific papers of authors 
with distinct national affiliations. As such, we expect that democratic countries tend to be 
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more open and collaborative with other countries in the international system, and that such 
increases in external complexity may be beneficial for the greater flourishing of scientific 
performance. Thus, we hypothesize that the relationship between democracy and science is 
enhanced by international collaboration.  
Hypothesis 4: International collaboration moderates the democracy-science 
relationship among countries in the international system. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data: The data for this research comes from multiple sources. For primary 
measures of democracy, we use the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) panel data (Coppedge 
et al. 2019) which were available 2008 to 2017 on 162 countries. For measures of 
globalization we include the KOF Swiss Economics Institute’s Globalization Index (Dreher, 
2006; Gygli et al., 2019). For economic complexity, we use the Economic Complexity Index 
(ECI+) from the MIT Observatory for Economic Complexity (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009; 
Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). We also use data from World Bank Open Data for control 
variables, including GDP per capita and population size. For measures of scientific production 
and impact we use Elsevier/Scopus bibliometric data aggregated at the national level, which 
was previously employed by Wagner et al. (2018b). 
3.2. Variables: The dependent variable in all regression models is national scientific 
performance, which is operationalized using Elsevier’s fractional field weighted citation index 
(Frac_FWCI). FWCI is a recently developed indicator of citation impact that accounts for 
variability across scientific fields by dividing observed citation counts by expected counts for 
the field (see Purkayastha et al. 2019). Fractional (Frac) counting means that proportions of 
authors are summed when calculating volumes and are weighed when relative citation impact 
is aggregated to the total citation impact of the country (Waltman & van Eck 2015; Wagner et 
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al. 2018a, 2018b). More recently, a modified fractional counting (MFC) approach was 
introduced that addresses variation between different co-authorship practices between fields 
(Sivertsen, Rousseau & Zhang, 2019). The MFC approach is evaluated for the use in counting 
contributions of entities but has not yet been applied to citation indicators and is therefore not 
yet applied in our methodology but may provide an enhancement in the future. A brief 
description of all variables is presented in Table 1. 
For the key independent variables that capture national democratic governance, this 
article uses the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem Project) data, which include five high 
level indices of democracy which are aggregated from mid-level and lower-level measures 
created from over 120 variables (Coppedge et al. 2019). The high-level indictors used in this 
article are polyarchy, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy indexes. 
Polyarchy is the basic indicator of electoral democracy adapted from Dahl (1998). The V-
Dem Project (2019:39) defines democracy in the following manner.   
“The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making 
rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the 
electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and 
civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by 
fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief 
executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an 
independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political 
relevance.” (V-Dem Project, 2019:39) 
 
For moderating variables, we include a measure of internal complexity operationalized 
using the Economic Complexity Index (ECI+) measure from MIT’s Observatory on 
Economic complexity. 2 The ECI measures the relative intensity of knowledge at the level of 
the country’s economy by assessing the complexity of a country’s export products (Hidalgo 
and Hausmann 2009). ECI+ modifies the variable by accounting for the difficulty of 
exporting for the country (Albeaik et al. 2017).  
 
2 Albeaik, et al. (2017:3-4) define ECI+ as such: “the complexity of an economy as the total exports of a country 
corrected by how difficult it is to export each product and by the size of that country’s export economy”. 
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For moderating variables of external complexity, we use two measures: globalization 
and international collaboration intensity. The first is the KOF Globalization Index, a panel 
data set, which is a high-level aggregation of numerous empirical measures across political, 
economic, and social globalization (Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2019). To measure 
international collaboration intensity, we divide the number of international papers a country 
co-produced in a given year by the total number of papers for the country-year, producing a 
percentage of the total country papers which are internationally co-published.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variable Source Brief Description Years Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) Polyarchy 
  
V-Dem Project Rule by many elected 
officials 
2007-17 1,364 0.585 0.267 0.016 0.948 
(2) Liberal  
Democracy 
  
V-Dem Project Individual and civil 
rights 
2007-17 1,364 0.478 0.277 0.031 0.914 
(3) Participatory  
Democracy 
  
V-Dem Project Suffrage and 
participation 
2007-17 1,364 0.388 0.217 0.011 0.832 
(4) Deliberative  
Democracy  
  
V-Dem Project Mode of political 
decision making 
2007-17 1,364 0.485 0.264 0.016 0.912 
(5) Egalitarian  
Democracy 
  
V-Dem Project Distribution of rights, 
resources, and power 
2007-17 1,364 0.469 0.251 0.033 0.9 
(6) Economic  
Complexity 
  
MIT Economic 
Observatory 
Knowledge intensity of 
products 
2007-15 844 0.232 0.908 -3.532 1.747 
(7) Globalization  
Index 
  
KOF Swiss Econ. 
Institute 
Integration with 
international system 
2007-17 1,237 68.689 13.072 33.226 91.313 
(8) Collaboration 
Intensity 
Elsevier/Scopus Percent of papers that 
are internationally co-
published 
2007-18 1,404 0.529 0.171 0.142 0.957 
(9) Total  
Publications 
  
Elsevier/Scopus Total publications by 
fractional count 
2007-18 1,404 19163.1 57215.97 88.98 529524.5 
(10) GDP 
Per Capita 
  
World Bank GDP divided by 
population size 
2007-17 1,214 24751.5 22982.85 807.44 140037.1 
(11) Population 
Size 
  
World Bank Population size  2007-17 1,238 5.78E+07 1.76E+08 3.12E+05 1.39E+09 
(12) Frac_FWCI  Elsevier/Scopus Fractional field 
weighted citation 
index  
2007-18 1,404 0.79 0.312 0.154 1.636 
 
For control variables, we include the fractional count of the number of papers 
produced by the country, which is a measure of the publication volume of the country and a 
measure of the size of the scientific system of the country. The fractional count accounts for 
the portion of the publications that are not inflated by international collaboration. We also 
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include population size, and per capita GDP – log transformations of these variables were also 
tested but did not result in significant effects for population or GDP.  
3.3. Sample: One limitation of Frac_FWCI aggregated at the national level, is that it is 
susceptible to outliers, where very low productivity countries co-publish all/most of their 
publications with high productivity nations. Thus, many otherwise unproductive nations 
appear to have very high impact numbers due solely to their collaboration with other 
productive nations. To disentangle part of this bias on Frac_FWCI we filtered out 
observations by analysing the distribution of full publication numbers of all countries, which 
shows a skewed distribution with a mean value of 12252.23, with the 25th percentile at 31 
papers, the 50th percentile at 279.5, and the 75th percentile at 3223. All subsequent analysis is 
performed on observations equal to or above 279.5 publications. This reduced the sample 
size, when including all model variables, from 164 to 124 countries. Further, filtering out low 
productivity observations produced a less skewed distribution in the dependent variable 
(Frac_FWCI).  
3.4. Methods: Because the data provided repeated observations on each country over a 
multiyear time period, the study was able to leverage panel data techniques to estimate 
relationships between the variables. However, reverse causality and omitted time-varying 
variable bias remain threats to internal validity for observational studies. Because the data 
coverage differs by variable, the data set is classified as unbalanced panel data. To 
accommodate the data structure, to account for fixed country and year effects, and to estimate 
the within-unit effect of a change in democracy on scientific performance, we chose to utilize 
a two-way fixed effects model. The model also uses cluster robust standard errors to account 
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
4. Results 
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The analysis begins with pairwise correlations between all variables used in the analysis. 
Because the data include repeated observations for each country over the time period, the 
variables were collapsed on the country mean for the full time period before pair-wise 
correlations were conducted. The correlations in Table 2 show moderate to strong correlations 
between all five democracy indexes and scientific performance (Frac_FWCI). The 
correlations also show moderate to strong correlations between economic complexity and 
globalization on Frac_FWCI with no significant association for collaboration intensity. 
Further, the correlations also show moderate to strong correlations between the democracy 
indexes, economic complexity, and globalization, with a negative but insignificant correlation 
with collaboration intensity. Thus, the results of the pairwise correlations warrant further 
analysis.  
Table 2 – Pairwise Correlations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Polyarchy 1           
(2) Liberal_Dem 0.980* 1          
(3) Participatory_Dem 0.976* 0.972* 1         
(4) Deliberative_Dem 0.976* 0.988* 0.963* 1        
(5) Egalitarian_Dem 0.957* 0.976* 0.952* 0.967* 1       
(6) Econ_Complexity 0.424* 0.495* 0.462* 0.473* 0.521* 1      
(7) Globalization_Ind 0.643* 0.713* 0.663* 0.688* 0.749* 0.799* 1     
(8) Collab_Intensity -0.135 -0.151 -0.143 -0.125 -0.149 -0.511* -0.357* 1    
(9) Tot_Publications 0.126 0.164 0.142 0.171 0.152 0.347* 0.212* -0.382* 1   
(10) GDP_Per_Capita 0.218* 0.324* 0.232* 0.311* 0.375* 0.490* 0.528* -0.073 0.13 1 
(11) Population_Size -0.097 -0.091 -0.088 -0.059 -0.125 0.156 -0.072 -0.389* 0.634* -0.122 1 
(12) Frac_FWCI 0.446* 0.528* 0.463* 0.536* 0.528* 0.457* 0.508* 0.173 0.260* 0.572* -0.04 
Table Notes: * p<0.05; The table shows the pairwise correlations between all variables; the mean value by country over the full time 
period was used for each variable to account for within subject correlation; Since the collapsed (mean) 50th percentile for full 
publications is different than the non-collapsed data, we first filtered out observations below or equal to the 50th percentile, which is 
207.25 publications (see sample section for explanation). 
 
Next, the analysis leverages the panel structure of the data which allows modelling of 
effects over time. Table 3 shows the results of the two-way fixed effects models, where 
country and year are both treated as fixed factors in the analysis, and cluster robust standard 
errors are used to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Supporting H1, the 
results show consistent positive and significant effects for each democracy index on scientific 
performance across Models 1-5. Model 5 shows that Egalitarian Democracy has the strongest 
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effect on scientific performance. The total publications (scientific volume) by the country also 
showed a strong positive effect on scientific performance. These results provide strong 
support for the general research question concerning the democracy-science compatibility 
thesis. 
Table 3 – Effects of Democracy on Scientific Performance (2007-2017) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5    
Polyarchy 0.168** 
   
                 
(3.26) 
   
                
Liberal_Democracy  
 
0.157** 
  
                  
(2.82) 
  
                
Participatory_Democracy 
  
0.217** 
 
                   
(2.82) 
 
                
Deliberative_Democracy  
   
0.153**                     
(2.96)                 
Egalitarian_Democracy  
    
0.267**       
(3.36)    
Tot_Publications 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**   
(3.11) (3.10) (3.13) (3.12) (3.14)    
GDP_Per_Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
(0.49) (0.48) (0.51) (0.45) (0.54)    
Population_Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000     
(-0.34) (-0.39) (-0.33) (-0.21) (-0.36)    
Constant 0.637*** 0.662*** 0.649*** 0.658*** 0.606*** 
  (8.08) (8.61) (8.26) (8.45) (7.05)    
N 1188 1188 1188 1188 1188 
#Countries 124 124 124 124 124 
r2 0.116 0.113 0.114 0.116 0.119    
Table Notes: The dependent variable is Frac_FWCI for all models. All models are two-way (country,year) fixed-effects models with 
country clustered standard errors; t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, **, p<0.01, *** p<0.001. GDP per capital and population size 
were also log transformed but did not produce significant effects. 
 
Next, the analysis tests the moderation effects of the complexity indicators, including 
one measure of internal complexity (economic complexity) and two measures of external 
complexity (globalization and collaboration intensity). Variables have been standardized with 
mean zero and standard deviation one, as is common practice for interaction terms. Model 1 
adds economic complexity to the basic polyarchy model, where both have positive estimates, 
but neither are significant. Model 2 interacts polyarchy with economic complexity, where the 
interaction term shows a positive and significant estimate and the main effect of economic 
complexity becomes significant. This result supports H2, which specifies that economic 
complexity enhances the democracy-science relationship. Model 3 adds the globalization 
index to the basic polyarchy model, where the main effect of polyarchy is positive and 
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significant, while globalization is positive but insignificant. Model 4 adds the interaction term 
between polyarchy and globalization, showing a negative but insignificant estimate on the 
term. This result fails to provide support for the moderation effect of globalization on the 
democracy-science relationship, specified in H3. Model 5 adds collaboration intensity to the 
basic polyarchy model, where both variables show a positive and significant effect. Model 6 
adds the interaction term between polyarchy and collaboration intensity, showing a negative 
and significant effect of the interaction on scientific performance. Again, this result 
contradicts H4, which specifies a positive moderation effect of collaboration intensity on the 
democracy-science relationship.  
Table 4 – Moderation Effects of Complexity (2007-2017) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7    
Polyarchy 0.025 0.009 0.042** 0.046** 0.032** -0.043* -0.039    
 (1.60) (0.48) (3.18) (3.05) (2.75) (-2.38) (-1.98)    
Econ_Complexity 0.033 0.050*     0.048*   
 (1.30) (2.17)     (2.15)    
Polyarchy X Econ_Complexity  0.064*     0.047*   
  (2.61)     (2.18)    
Globalization_Index   0.031 0.023   0.010    
   (0.50) (0.38)   (0.21)    
Polyarchy X Globalization_Index    -0.024   -0.063*   
    (-0.85)   (-2.06)    
Collab_Intensity     0.118** 0.086** 0.060*   
     (3.03) (3.14) (2.37)    
Polyarchy X Collab_Intensity      -0.089*** -0.074*** 
      (-5.14) (-4.70)    
Tot_Publications 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  
 (2.85) (3.32) (3.09) (3.05) (3.08) (2.85) (3.28)    
GDP_Per_Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*   
 (1.45) (1.63) (0.58) (0.60) (0.40) (1.14) (2.13)    
Population_Size -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*   
 (-2.49) (-2.52) (-0.27) (-0.20) (0.13) (-0.50) (-2.03)    
Constant 0.710*** 0.674*** 0.708*** 0.725*** 0.817*** 0.775*** 0.795*** 
 (9.70) (8.92) (8.44) (9.36) (11.58) (14.39) (12.51)    
N 831 831 1167 1167 1188 1188 822 
#Countries 100 100 121 121 124 124 99 
r2 0.119 0.150 0.113 0.116 0.191 0.284 0.323    
Table Notes: The dependent variable is Frac_FWCI for all models. All models are two-way (country,year) fixed-effects with country 
clustered standard errors; Variables in interaction terms are standardized; t statistics in parentheses; N varies across models due to 
uneven data coverage of variables; * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
Model 7 includes all variables at once, showing a positive and significant interaction 
between polyarchy and economic complexity, and negative and significant interactions 
between polyarchy and globalization and collaboration intensity. This result provides support 
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for H2 but contradicts H3 and H4. The results provide support for the general research 
question that complexity moderates the democracy-science effect.   
To illustrate the interaction effects between polyarchy, economic complexity, 
globalization, and international percent, the analysis shows three margin plots in Figure 1, 2, 
and 3, corresponding respectively to Models 2, 4, and 6 in table 4. Figure 1 shows that the 
highest margin of democracy has the steepest positive slope on Frac_FWCI as the level of 
economic complexity increases. This indicates that as complexity increases more democratic 
nations experience gains in scientific performance. As the level of polyarchy declines the 
effect of economic complexity on scientific performance appears to reverse.   
Figure 1 – Interaction Effect of Polyarchy and Economic Complexity on Scientific 
Performance  
 
 Figure 2 shows the margin plot for the interaction effect of polyarchy and 
globalization on Frac_FWCI. The figure shows that the higher level of polyarchy has a flat 
effect on Frac_FWCI as globalization increases, while lower levels of polyarchy increase the 
positive effect of globalization on Frac_FWCI. Contrary to the hypothesis, this indicates that 
the science systems of less democratic countries are benefiting more from globalization. The 
non-intersecting lines indicate the interaction is non-significant. 
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Figure 2 - Interaction Effect of Polyarchy and Globalization on Scientific Performance 
 
 Finally, Figure 3 shows the margin plot for the interaction effect of polyarchy and 
international collaboration on Frac_FWCI. The margin plot shows a similar interaction effect 
to Figure 2, where the highest level of polyarchy shows a flat line on Frac_FWCI as the 
values on international collaboration increase. As the level of polyarchy declines, the effect of 
international collaboration increases. Contrary to the hypothesis, this suggests that less 
democratic countries are benefiting more from international collaboration. 
Figure 3 - Interaction Effect of Polyarchy and Collaboration Intensity on Scientific 
Performance 
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5. Discussion  
We began this work seeking to test a long-standing research question regarding the 
relationship between democratic governance and national scientific performance. The results 
provided strong support for the subject line expectations. Specifically, the first hypothesis, 
which suggests that democratic governance enhances scientific performance, was supported 
by the analysis, showing significant effects of all five high-level democracy indicators on 
scientific performance. Egalitarian democracy showed the strongest effect. The results also 
support the second general research question regarding the moderating effects of complexity 
on the democracy-science relationship. Specifically, the second hypothesis, which suggests 
that economic complexity moderates the democracy-science relationship, was supported by 
the analysis, showing significant positive interaction effects between democracy and 
economic complexity on scientific performance. However, the analysis showed an unexpected 
contradiction to H3, which suggests that globalization moderates the democracy-science 
relationship, and H4, which suggests that collaboration intensity moderates the democracy-
science relationship. The results showed significant negative interaction effects between 
democracy and globalization on scientific performance, and between democracy and 
international collaboration on scientific performance. Table 5 summarizes the implications of 
the research for the hypotheses.  
Table 5 – Summary of Results  
Hypothesis  Dependent Variable Key Independent Variable Result  
H1: Democratic governance enhances the scientific performance of 
countries in the international system. 
Scientific Performance  Five Democracy Indices + 
H2: Economic complexity positively moderates the democracy-
science relationship among countries in the international system. 
Scientific Performance  Polyarchy*Econ_Complexity  + 
H3: Globalization positively moderates the democracy-science 
relationship among countries in the international system. 
Scientific Performance  Polyarchy*Globalization - 
H4: International collaboration positively moderates the democracy-
science relationship among countries in the international system. 
Scientific Performance  Polyarchy*Collab_Intensity - 
 
  The results provide empirical support for a body of conceptual work done by 
philosophers and social science scholars over centuries. The question whether democratic 
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governance is generically a positive environment for effective conduct of scientific inquiry 
has been one which has mostly been conjecture from armchair theorists and was frequently 
supported or challenged by analysis of cases for and against the hypothesis generated from the 
anecdotes of history. Many of these cases have given significant justification for believing 
that theory would not hold up in the face of broad empirical testing. More recently, Gao et al. 
(2017) provided a confounding study to the hypothesis, tested on the adjacent domain of 
technological innovation. Further, prominent cases seem to defy the hypothesis. For example, 
Russia, has become more democratic since the fall of the Soviet Union, yet its science system 
has suffered greatly, largely due to underinvestment and lack of state interest. China, on the 
other hand, has authoritarian governance yet has experienced gains in scientific performance. 
Yet the current study demonstrates that on average countries in the international system that 
experience increases or decreases in democracy also experience increases or decreases in 
scientific performance.     
 The study goes beyond the basic democracy-science compatibility thesis, recasting 
democratic governance itself as a type of complex system (e.g. Simon 1996), which permits 
greater internal and external heterogeneity and complexity than autocratic governance 
permits. As such the study advanced a second research question of, how does complexity 
moderate the democracy-science relationship? We expected to find that internal complexity 
has an upward moderating effect on the democracy-science effect. The results supported this 
expectation, showing that the internal knowledge intensity of nations, i.e. economic 
complexity, enhances the gains of democratization on scientific performance. This result 
speaks to the theory that democracy itself, and more specifically decentralized egalitarian 
democracy, permits a greater level of structural complexity than other governance forms (e.g. 
Wiesner et al. 2018).  
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 However, the study revealed something interesting about the interaction between 
democratic governance and external complexity, measured through globalization and 
international collaboration. We expected to find that external complexity moderates the 
democracy-science effect upward. Yet the results show something less straightforward and 
perhaps more troubling. It appears that increases in scientific performance among advanced 
democracies do not hinge on globalization or international collaboration. Rather, the reverse 
seems to be correct. Autocratic and less democratic countries are experiencing increases in 
their levels of scientific performance largely because of globalization and international 
collaboration with the advanced democracies of the world. There appears to be directionality 
in the flow of knowledge. While historical evidence supports the claim that democracy 
provides fertile ground for the flourishing of science, countries with centralized forms of 
autocratic governance appear to have gained scientific capacity by collaborating with more 
decentralized democracies. Thus, advanced autocracies have been able to build scientific 
capacity without the emergent, self-organizing system that gave rise to the science in the first 
place. This raises a follow-on question, could these these less democratic countries have 
developed robust scientific system without heavy reliance on the democratic governance 
structure. This question remains unanswered.  
It is unclear how long this trend might last, whether there is a point at which 
globalization and collaboration can only go so far, and whether/what proportion of the result 
is a function of the mere fact that less democratic countries simply have more room for 
growth in the global network of science. It also raises the question for public policy makers of 
whether and to what extent democracies wish to continue to facilitate knowledge-flows to less 
democratic countries without additional assurances that openness, trust, and integrity of the 
scientific system is honored. 
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 5.1. Limitations: As with all non-experimental data, the study cannot rule out threats to 
internal validity, such as the influence of unique historical conditions. Our data on democracy 
and science come from a highly developed period in the 21st century where the vast majority 
of countries have already established systems of governance that only change in small ways. 
For example, during the study period the United States of America has a slightly declining 
democracy index, due mostly to its score on functioning of government, while the other core 
indicators of democracy remain largely fixed. This problem of low variation on the key 
independent variable means that large stretches of time are necessary to establish causation 
regarding the within country effects of democracy on science. As such, the conclusions of the 
study are limited to associational claims between countries.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Until very recently, the thesis that democratic governance is requisite for scientific 
advancement has mostly been asserted by philosophers through the examination of numerous 
cases. It has been difficult to test, yet recent advancements in bibliometric techniques used to 
track the development and influence of scientific activity have provided new means for 
establishing the relative advantage of countries in science. This study puts the democracy-
science compatibility thesis to the test by analysing the relationship between measures of 
democratic governance and scientific performance among a large sample of 124 countries 
over roughly a decade in the early 21st century. This study shows significant effects of 
democracy on scientific performance, using fixed effects panel data analysis, controlling for 
number of scientific papers, GDP per capita, and population size. This research also finds that 
egalitarian democracy is a stronger relative predictor of scientific performance than other 
indicators of democracy, and recent history has supported this in some cases such as the 
success of Denmark and the fall of Russia. Finally, this research finds interesting interaction 
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effects of internal and external complexity, where internal economic complexity enhances the 
democracy-science relationship, and interactions with globalization and international 
collaboration appear to have the opposite effect. This surprising result potentially indicates 
that less democratic countries in the international system are reaping gains in scientific 
performance through increases in external complexity. This is a subject for further research.  
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